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COMMENT
WHO LET THE CAT OUT OF THE BAG? INTERNET
DATA LEAKAGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY IN HONG KONG
The cat is out of the bag and there is no putting it back. On Friday, 10 March
the South Morning China Post reported that 20,000 complaint files against
the Hong Kong police were freely accessible on the Internet on the website
www.china2easy.com. Included in the complaint files were the names,
addresses, and identification numbers of complainants, the dates of the com-
plaints, and in a few instances, details of previous criminal convictions. Some
of the more serious cases involved corruption, fraud, and sexual abuse. Of the
cases disclosed, seven are still being investigated. While the information on
the website was quickly removed, the information could still be accessed sev-
eral days later via the Google Archives and Cache.I It soon became apparent
that this information had been leaked and made available on the Internet
some three years earlier, although it was only recently that it was tripped
upon and the situation exposed by shareholder activist David Webb.2 The
full extent of the damage sustained by the complainants and the greater Hong
Kong community has yet to be assessed.
A series of incidents occurring in Hong Kong at about the same time served
to compound the issue. These included the discovery that personal customer
records of the telecommunications company CSL, and insurance records
of ING customers who had purchased insurance from 1984 and 2004, were
available on the Internet;3 a shooting of two police officers in Tsim Sha Tsui
which appeared to be related to police corruption;4 a complaint lodged with
the Privacy Commissioner regarding the unlawful disclosure of personal
information from Yahoo!hk leading to the arrest and jailing of mainland
journalist Shi Tao;' and finally, the release of customers' personal data
by employees of banks and financial companies to outside third parties.'
These incidents combined to set alarm bells ringing in the Hong Kong
community, with calls for reform of personal data law, including Internet
The list was additionally uploaded as a bitTorrent file to the Internet by a user know by the pseu-
donym "Big Crook", with several hundred people having downloaded the list.
2 See report in the South China Morning Post, 10 Mar 2006.
3 See Robin Kwong, "Details of 600 insurance holders found on Google," South China Moming Post,
14 Mar 2006.
4 See CNN report, "'Devil Cop' shooting shakes HK," available at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/
WORLD/asiapcf/03/26/hk.devilcop.ap/index.html (last accessed 4 Apr 2006).
5 See Cynthia Wan and Gary Cheung, "Privacy complaint over Yahoo's mail leak," South China
Morning Post, 1 Apr 2006.
6 Chandra Wong, "Court hears of 'unwritten law' to release personal data," South China Morning Post,
29 Mar 2006.
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Service Provider (ISP) liability and responsibilities, a review of data security
technology and policies, and a re-evaluation of the Independent Police Com-
plaints Council (IPCC) and the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO).
While the public may have been shocked by these bombshells, many privacy
and technology experts were not. They knew that the privacy bomb had been
dropped a long time ago, at the beginning of the digital era. It had merely
taken time for the public to feel the bomb's reverberations.
These incidents are a timely reminder of the need for an adequate level of
technological, administrative, and legislative safeguards to effectively pro-
tect personal data in the digital age. This Comment examines the potential
legal remedies available for those individuals on the IPCC database whose
personal information was disclosed on the Internet.
Using Privacy Law for Legal Redress
The concept of privacy may be divided into two general aspects. The first is
protection from invasion of or interference with one's privacy in the more
general sense of the term. This is often referred to as interception of com-
munications or surveillance, and is protected by constitutional instruments
(Articles 28 and 29 of the Basic Law'), international instruments (Article 39
of the Basic Law, which gives effect to Articles 17 and 8 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)), specific legislative instru-
ments (pending enactment of the Interception of Communications and
Surveillance Bill'), and general common law principles such as the tort of
invasion of privacy. The second aspect relates to the protection of personal
data or information privacy which is often protected by personal data
instruments, such as the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance9 (PDPO) and
by common law principles such as the tort of breach of confidence, and
negligence.'o This Comment is concerned with personal data and informa-
tion privacy.
Why the PDPO is not Likely to Provide an Appropriate Legal Remedy
Several individuals from the complaint files have lodged complaints with the
Privacy Commissioner. It is doubtful, however, that the PDPO will be able to
provide an appropriate legal remedy. To understand why this is so, reference
must be had to certain terms in the PDPO:
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
(Cap 2101).
8 Interception of Communications and Surveillance Bill (Bills Committee first reading, 8/3/2006).
9 Cap 486.
10 For a comprehensive overview of applicable privacy law see generally Mark Berthold and Professor
Raymond Wacks, Hong Kong Data Privacy Law: Territorial Regulation in a Borderless World (Hong
Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003).
8 Alana Maurushat (2006) HKLJ
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"data subject" ( W4ft1&A ), in relation to personal data, means the
individual who is the subject of the data;
"data user" ( W4*fW W ), in relation to personal data, means a person
who, either alone or jointly or in common with other persons, controls
the collection, holding, processing or use of the data;
"personal data" ( RIA 1W ) means any data-
(a) relating directly or indirectly to a living individual;
(b) from which it is practicable for the identity of the individual to be
directly or indirectly ascertained; and
(c) in a form in which access to or processing of the data is practicable.
Under section 4 of the PDPO, data users must follow the six Data Protection
Principles espoused in Schedule 1. The principles can be summarised using
the following headings:
Principle 1: Purpose and manner of collection of personal data
Principle 2: Accuracy and duration of retention of personal data
Principle 3: Use of personal data
Principle 4: Security of personal data
Principle 5: Information to be generally available
Principle 6: Access to personal data
The PDPO binds both the Government (each government agency or depart-
ment is a separate data user), non-govemment entities (eg corporations), and
individuals. Often, personal data disclosure on the Internet is not subject to
the PDPO. The nature of the information disclosed would not constitute
personal data for the purposes of the PDPO. For example, one's internet pro-
tocol address, home phone number, web browsing habits and even a
photograph - anything short of an intent to reveal information on the scale of
the name of an individual" - would likely not fall within the purview of the
PDPO. In the case of the IPCC disclosure, all definitions are clearly satisfied
and, on the face of it, there was a violation (even perhaps aptly described as a
" See Alana Maurushat, "Multi-lateral Recognition of PKI Certification Authorities in the Asian
Region: Transborder Data Flow and Information Privacy Issues," (2005) 35 HKLJ 569. The author
writes, "The 1999 Court of Appeal case of Eastweek Publisher v Privacy Commissioner, casts serious
doubt as to the broad scope of PDPO. Eastweek Publisher published a photograph of a young woman
taken from the populated and busy area of Hong Kong known as Causeway Bay. Although the
photographer was unable to obtain consent from the young woman, the photograph was published.
The photograph was labeled, 'Japanese Mushroom Head' followed with a scathing article describing
this young woman's utter lack of fashion sense. On the issue of whether the PDPO had been violated,
the court ruled, in a 2 to 1 ruling, that there was a lack of intent to identify the young woman or to
compile personal data about her" (p 582).
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gross violation) of Data Principle 4: security of personal data. That said, it is
unlikely that the PDPO would provide a suitable legal remedy in the form of
compensation.
Data Principle 4 mandates that the data user take all reasonably practicable
steps to protect personal data. Berthold and Wacks identify five important
security data factors:
1) the kind of data and the harm that could result if any of those things
should occur,
2) the physical location where the data is stored,
3) any security measures incorporated (whether by automated means or
otherwise) into any equipment in which the data are stored,
4) any measures taken to ensure the integrity, prudence and competence
of persons having access to the data, and
5) any measures taken to ensure the secure transmission of data.12
In the current context, the facts are not conclusive but seem to indicate that
human oversight was the culprit. The government has comprehensive secur-
ity policies in place.13 However, the exact type of technology and security
measures taken have not been officially disclosed to the public. Bits of infor-
mation have been revealed in the newspapers and, not surprisingly, some of
the best commentary on the situation may be found on web blogs.'4 It is difficult
at this point to paint a full picture of the technological blunder. The IPCC
had commissioned EDPS Systems to reformat the files from the old IPCC
computer system to a new system which would match CAPO's system. EDPS
then sub-contracted the task to an independent data engineer, Kirren Heung
(all this was standard outsourcing practice). Initially, the IPCC claimed that
the information had never been put on an Internet system. A few days later
the IPCC indicated that the contractor made the false assumption
that the information was password-protected for both the uploading and
downloading of files. Subsequently, during the transfer, the information
was made available on the Internet in raw data form. Data leaks are often
caused by misconfiguration of software allowing for malware (malicious
software, eg computer virus, spyware, bug) to retrieve the data.'5 This theory
would not, however, explain how the information became available on
www.china2easy.com under the sub-file of "Kirren". It is possible that the
12 Note 10 above, pp 274-277.
1 See the Hong Kong Government Security Standards issued by the Office of the Government Chief
Information Officer: Baseline IT Security Policy and Baseline Security Guidelines.
1 For example, see the reporting from the web blog, "Data Blunder" on the website "flagrant harbour"
available at http://flagrantharbour.com/?p= 178 (last accessed 3 Apr 2006).
1 G. Serazzi and S. Zanero, "Computer virus propagation models," (2004) Performance Tools and
Applications to Networked Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol 2965, pp 26-50.
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contractor did not use the FTP protocol to shield it from the directories of
search engine spiders used by Google (HTTP would allow for this). Still, this
does not explain how it became available in the sub-file of a Hong Kong
company specialising in mobile phone accessories and kitchenware. 6 Shortly
afterwards, EDPS painted a different picture of the situation, claiming that
the sub-contractor requested a dummy file to conduct a test run. The disc
provided by the IPCC, however, contained the real and live data. EDPS claims
that the IPCC did not inform it that the disc did not contain phoney infor-
mation, but the actual real and sensitive information from the files. And so
we still do not have the full picture.
If we assume that all of the alleged facts are correct, it is clear that using
such sensitive data for a test run without, at the very least, password protec-
tion for both the upload and download would constitute a security breach. In
fact, it is standard practice that data of this level of sensitivity be encrypted.
There is no evidence to date that such an elementary security measure was
taken. It would be difficult to conclude that all reasonably practicable steps
had been taken. It seems that all parties involved (IPCC, EDPS, and the
independent contractor) share a degree of negligence such that Data Prin-
ciple 4 has been violated. But the reality is that it probably doesn't matter. As
Professor Graham Greenleaf comments:
"The new Privacy Commissioner Roderick Woo freely admits the law's
deficiencies, noting that data users who breach a privacy principle (such
as the security principle) cannot be prosecuted if they take steps to stop
further breaches occurring. In effect, 'everyone is allowed one mistake,'
he says.""
The focus of the PDPO is on education and mediation between data subjects
and data users. Normally the Privacy Commissioner will investigate the com-
plaints, then make a report with a series of recommendations for the data
user, to prevent further violations. If the Privacy Commissioner takes excep-
tion to this case, it is within his authority to order that fines be paid of up to
HK$50,0000 - hardly an appropriate solution given the severity of negligent
conduct and the harm which may result from the disclosure of such sensitive
data. Prosecution may occur but there is a paucity of cases that have been
referred for prosecution. In the event of a recommendation to prosecute, the
prosecution itself would be conducted by the police as the Privacy Commis-
sioner does not possess the power to prosecute. The inappropriateness of this
16 The www.china2easy.com page is no longer accessible on the Internet, though it was on 14 Mar
2006, in spite of the file having been removed from the site on 10 Mar 2006.
17 Graham Greenleaf, "Personal data spills stun Hong Kong," for publication in Privacy Laws and
Business International Newsletter (19 Mar 2006).
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arrangement, given the circumstances of the leak and the nature of the data,
concerning as it did, police conduct, is obvious and need not be elaborated
further.
Section 66 may appear to offer an appropriate remedy as it allows the
affected individuals to sue in the courts, as well as to instigate a class action
suit. Section 66 confers discretion on the court to award damages for "injury
to feelings." There is no cap on monetary compensation under this provision.
On the surface the use of section 66 would appear to be straightforward. There
are a number of hurdles however which make this remedy less attractive.
First, no one has ever succeeded in court. Second, Hong Kong courts gener-
ally do not invite class actions. Third, the onus is on the plaintiff to show that
there was a failure on the part of the data user to take all reasonably practi-
cable steps to secure the data. The foregoing requirement may indeed prove
onerous given the unclear picture as to how the data was actually leaked.
Last, the Privacy Commissioner does not have the power to assist citizens in
litigation, in which case affected individuals have to hire their own legal
counsel.
Why the Common Law may not Provide a Better Remedy than the PDPO
Two pertinent tort actions may appear to be more useful as a means of legal
redress: breach of confidence and negligence. The tort action for breach of
confidence provides an equitable remedy where confidential information is
unlawfully disclosed. The exact legal test for breach of confidence is unsettled
in Hong Kong law. It is generally thought that three elements have to
be proved for a case in breach of confidence to succeed, though it remains
unclear as to whether the third element is a requirement, or merely a con-
sideration to be taken into account:
the information itself must have the necessary quality of confidence
about it,
that information must have been imparted in circumstances import-
ing an obligation of confidence, and
there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detri-
ment of the party communicating it."
The recent House of Lords decision in Campbell v MGN Ltd" has altered the
requirements for a breach of confidence action. The House of Lords' decision
eliminated the need for there to be a relationship of confidence, and replaced
18 Kenny Wong and Alice Lee, A Practical Approach to Intellectual Property in Hong Kong (Hong Kong:
Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002) p 227. The authors refer to the test put forth in the case of Coco v AN
Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, p 47.
1 [2004] UKHL 22 [hereinafter Campbell].
12 Alana Maurushat (2006) HKLJ
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the former requirement of "unauthorised use" with one of misuse of private
information. The emphasis in Campbell was placed on the question of whether
the information was private in nature. The House of Lords stated that the
tort of breach of confidence was better suited to the name "wrongful disclo-
sure of private information". We do not know whether Hong Kong will follow
the Campbell decision or whether the original three elements for breach of
confidence will stand.
If Hong Kong adopts the test in Campbell, then the IPCC and EDPS should
have their chequebooks on hand. If, however, the Hong Kong courts reject
the approach in Campbell, the third element of "unauthorised disclosure" may
be difficult to prove. Past case law has focused on whether the plaintiff had
expressly or impliedly consented to imparting with personal information." In
the Hong Kong circumstance, the information was given to the IPCC with
express consent, although this consent would not apply to the misuse of the
information. Another interesting point is whether consent is required when
the data user outsources computer security tasks that involve sensitive infor-
mation. Damages in this case would likely be for emotional distress but, due
to the safety implications of this sensitive information, it is of no small matter
that we may see additional types of damages sought in the future.
Although the conduct of the IPCC and EDPS would imply negligent con-
duct in the ordinary sense of the term, the tort of negligence is not applicable
in this circumstance. Negligence does not protect privacy interests in the
absence of physical damage or, in the context of a Hedley Byrne style relation-
ship, 1 economic loss.
Concluding Remarks
In a series of press releases the Privacy Commissioner has urged affected
citizens to seek compensation. Unfortunately, as noted above, the Privacy
Commissioner does not have any power to award compensation, nor does he
have the right to assist citizens in any type of litigation. There are obstacles in
the way of those individuals who select the litigation route. They may not be
able to find sufficient evidence as to what actually transpired in the process
leading up to the data leakage. The potential high cost of legal fees may also
act as a further deterrence.
Is there a flower among the weeds? The driving force of this incident may
provide the motivation for change. There is incentive to expand the powers
20 Berthold and Wacks, "Chapter 4: Data Privacy and the Common Law," p 19. The authors cite the
case of Saltman Engineering Co. Ltd v Campbell Engineering Co. Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 213 per Lord
Greene MR.
21 Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [19641 AC 465. The requirements are onerous. See
generally Rick Glofcheski, Tort Law in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Sweet and Maxwell Asia, 2002)
pp 160-173.
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of the Privacy Commissioner, to amend information data law to reflect pri-
vacy needs in the digital era, to review the policies and information systems
used in data transfer (eg outsourcing, smart ID cards), and to revisit the issue
of an independent monitoring authority for the IPCC at the first opportunity.
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